Macro II - Fluctuations - ENSAE, 2024-2025
2025-03-26
DSGE models are often criticized for unrealistic assumptions
Example:
Macroeconomic Policy in DSGE and Agent-Based Models from Revue de l’OFCE
In that respect, the Great Recessions has revealed to be a natural experiment for economic analysis, showing the inadequacy of the predominant theoretical frameworks. Indeed, an increasing number of leading economists claim that the current ’’economic crisis is a crisis for economic theory’’ (Kirman, 2010; Colander et al., 2009; Krugman, 2009, 2011; Caballero, 2010; Stiglitz, 2011; Kay, 2011; Dosi, 2011; Delong, 2011). The basic assumptions of mainstream DSGE models, e.g. rational expectations, representative agents, perfect markets etc., prevent the understanding of basic phenomena underlying the current economic crisis
But:
mainstream models typically incorporate many non classical elements. For instance New Keynesian models feature imperfect competition
one must distinguish mainstream models from DSGE methodology
Under the Representative agent assumption
Is it a simplifying assumption?
Or is it actually equivalent to the aggregation of many optimization problems?
For the latter one needs a theory of aggregation1
Let’s consider three versions of the neoclassical model
Note:
Some economists have recognized early the need to explicitly model heterogeneity.
1977: Bewley
Huggett Economy (1993)
Ayiagari Model (1994)
Krussell Smith Model (1998)
Those models require special computational techniques and were poorly understood mathematically
2012 Ben Moll did a talk at IMA (UK)
Economists and world class mathematicians exchanged on mean field games
2012 Ben Moll did a talk at IMA (UK)
Result: a new stream of heterogenous agents papers
PDE Models in Macroeconomics (2014) with Achdou, Bueary, Lasry, Lions
The Dynamics of Inequality (2016) with Gabaix, Lasry, Lions
Monetary Policy According to HANK (2018) with Kaplan and Violante
Monetary Policy According to HANK (2018), by Moll, Kaplan and Violante
Stimulated a whole literature1
Why does it matter to model consumer’s heterogeneity?
Classically, we make the difference between two kinds of agents:
Ricardian Households
Agents who can freely reallocate consumption intertemporally.
They have a high marginal propensity to consume out of additional income.
Ricardian households choose not to consume more today, in order to consume more tomorrow.
Keynesian Households
Agents whose consumption in the current period is limited by a binding credit constraint. Either they can’t borrow at all or the amount they can borrow is limited today.
They have a high marginal propensity to consume out of additional income.
Keynesian Households consume today as much as they can.
The representative agent assumes everyone is ricardian.
What does the data say?
Let’s have a look at the MPC distribution for France.1
Average MPC by Cash-on-Hand Percentiles
Apparently MPC is well predicted by Cash-in-hand (amount of money left to household after having made all compulsory payments).
Wealth distribution
Wealth decomposition
Agents in the middle of the wealth distribution have a mortgage, whose interests leaves very little to spend after payments. They have lower cash-in-hand hence higher marginal propensity to consume (than rich agents).
We have just seen that agents in the middle of the wealth distribution, hold a wider proportion of wealth in illiquid assets (housing)
Specify several kinds of agents:
By endogenizing borrowing constraint with borrowing constraint
By using preference for wealth
Inequality, Leverage and Crisis, Kumhof, Rancière, Winant (2015)
The 2007 financial crisis, was initially as subprime mortgage crisis
Ok, but from a macro perspective, what fueled such high levels of borrowing?
A similar pattern emerged before the great recession and before the great depression:1
Wealth Inequality
Increase in wealth inequality is consistent.
Econometric measures of household default risk 1 rose consistently.
What could link rising income inequality to increased borrowing by bottom-earners?
Intuition:
Let’s see how to model that in DSGE fashion (ommiting default risk for the sake of simplicity)
We consider and endowment economy:
\[y_t = (1-\rho_y) \overline{y} + \rho_y y_{t-1} + \epsilon_{y,t}\]
\[z_t = (1-\rho_z) \overline{z} + \rho_z z_{t-1} + \epsilon_{z,t}\]
Comments:
\(z_t\) is the fraction of the total output that is received by top-earners. The rest is received by bottom earners.
We assume there is a faction \(\chi\) of top earners.
our goal is to study the effect of a persistent inequality shock (with \(\rho_z=1\))
We choose the following utility function for top earners: \[U_t = E_t \sum_{k\geq0}^{\infty} \beta^k_{\tau} \left\{ \frac{\left(c^{\tau}_{t+k}\right)^ {1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}} + \varphi \frac{\left( 1+b_{t+k}\frac{1-\chi}{\chi}\right)^{1-\frac{1}{\eta}}}{1-\frac{1}{\eta}} \right\}\]
Consumption: \[c^{\tau}_t = y_t z_t \frac{1}{\chi} + \left(b_{t-1}-b_t p_t\right)\frac{1-\chi}{\chi}\] where \(b_t\) is debt holdings and \(p_t\) the price of it \(1/r_t\)
Optimality condition from \(\max U_t\)
\[p_t = \beta_{\tau} E_t\left[ \left( \frac{c^{\tau}_{t+1}}{c^{\tau}_t}\right)^ {-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right] + \varphi \frac{\left(1+b_t \frac{1-\chi}{\chi}\right)^ {-\frac{1}{\eta}}}{\left(c_t^{\tau}\right)^ {-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}\]
The preference for wealth can be justified as:
It implies a steady-state supply of lending for any income level:
Which in turn implies non-zero marginal propensity to save from a permanent income shock (in the short and the long run)
Parameters \(\eta\) and \(\varphi\) are not observed, but can be chosen in order to match real world MPC (50% for top earners).
Bottom earners are standard:
\[V_t = E_t \sum_{k \geq 0}^{\infty} \beta^k_b \left( \frac{\left(c_{t+k}^b\right)^ {1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \right)\]
Budget constraint:
\[c^b_t = y_t(1-z_t)\frac{1}{1-\chi} + \left(b_t p_t - b_{t-1}\right)\]
Optimality condition from \(\max V_t\)
\[p_t = \beta^b E_t \left[ \left( \frac{c_{t+1}^b}{c_t^b}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \right]\]
Calibration
Inequality Shock
Pseudo-Historical Simulation
In the simulation we use historical values for the driving shocks (output and inequality).
What is the predictive power of the model: