Topics in Economics, ESCP, 2024-2025
2025-03-16
The extraordinary threat posed by illegal aliens and drugs, including deadly fentanyl, constitutes a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).
February 1, 2025
Until the crisis is alleviated, President Donald J. Trump is implementing a 25% additional tariff on imports from Canada and Mexico and a 10% additional tariff on imports from China. Energy resources from Canada will have a lower 10% tariff.
The current US president
But why?
🤷‍♂️ He has done that in the past.
What will hapen next?
Ulam: name a principle in the social sciences that is both true and nonobvious
Samuelson: Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage
That this idea is logically true, need not be argued before a mathematician; that it is not trivial is attested by the thousands of important and intelligent men who have never been able to grasp the doctrine for themselves or to believe it after it was explained to them
Many theories show, under certain assumptions, the superiority of trade over autarky, in terms of economic well-being:
Before Smith, the Mercantilists (16th-17th century):
Adam Smith (1723-1790): Scottish.
One of the founding fathers of classical economics. His question: “Why do countries engage in international trade?”
Limitation: In this theoretical framework, a country whose production costs are higher than those of all its partners cannot export profitably.
This theory does not explain why a country that is more efficient in the production of all goods would still benefit from maintaining trade relations with its neighboring countries.
David Ricardo (1772-1823)
A country can benefit from specialization by producing the goods for which it has a comparative advantage, even if it has an absolute disadvantage in all the goods it produces (unlike Smith).
Assumption: labor is the only factor of production and is mobile within the country but immobile internationally
To show that trade is always preferable, he imagines that Portugal has an absolute advantage over England for two goods, which, according to Adam Smith’s theory, would prevent trade from occurring.
Portugal | England | |
---|---|---|
1m cloth | A=90h | C=100h |
1L wine | B=80h | D=120h |
Total (h) | 170h | 220h |
In which good should England specialize in? (compare productivity ratios for both countriess)
The Ricardo model has two fundamental conclusions: all countries can benefit from (the option) to trade, which allows for more efficient production.
In a trade situation, countries will specialize in the production of the good where they have a comparative advantage (higher productivity ratio).
First published in a more literary form by Bertil Ohlin, who attributed the co-authorship of the model to his thesis advisor, Eli Heckscher, in 1933.
In 1941, Paul Samuelson and Wolfgang Stolper deduced an important theorem on factor remuneration, which was systematically incorporated into the presentation of the model, now known by the acronym HOS.
In this model, international trade is based on differences in factor endowments (labor, capital, resources, etc.). It thus highlights that differences in productivity between countries (i.e., Ricardo) are not the only explanation for comparative advantages.
The conclusions of the HOS model are:
Many intuitions and results, but:
Most of its predictions are contradicted by international trade flows:
In the 1970s, Krugman (1980) and Helpman (1981), then Helpman and Krugman (1985), introduced new elements into the theory of comparative advantage, which are increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition.
This model allows for the consideration of intra-industry trade between countries with similar levels of development. Why?
Product differentiation within the same industry.
The first entrants to the market are then advantaged, and the increasing returns (average production cost decreases as the quantity produced increases) that result from this position lead to a monopoly or oligopoly situation in the market, creating barriers to entry for new entrants.
Thus, international trade is dominated by these large companies, generally from countries with a lot of capital and operating in markets with very limited competition.
In 2003, Melitz introduced the notion of heterogeneous firms (the Melitz model)
Heterogeneity contributes to amplifying the gains from liberalization
Opening up to trade contribute to raising productivity, not only through economies of scale but also through a Darwinian process of firm selection.
These models are all fascinating but are there supported by the data?
Empirical approach to explain trade: gravity models
Newton Gravity Model
Trade Gravity model
Vij=G(Mi)(β1)(Mj)(β2)(Dij)β3ηij
Works fairly well and confirms predictions from the theories.
Theoretical models “justify” trade, with (globally and without considering externalities) mutual gains, thanks to:
In theory, trade is profitable.
In practices all countries protect themselves.
Let’s discuss briefly:
of these trade policies
The Grossman and Helpman model is a common agency model (one agent, several principals) with a two-stage game.
The basic analytical framework is that of a model with several production sectors with specific factors. Each sector produces a particular good with labor and a factor of production specific to the sector.
The vector of trade policy determines a tariff (positive or negative) on imports in each sector.
The model features pressure groups:
It is a zero-sum game
In the first stage, pressure groups define their contribution functions.
Pressure groups choose their contributions non-cooperatively and independently of each other, in order to maximize the welfare of their members.
In the second stage, the incumbent government chooses its political position taking into account the contribution functions defined by the pressure groups.
Formally, the government seeks to maximize an “objective” function that is a weighted average of contributions and general welfare, with the goal of rewarding interest groups and being re-elected in the next election.
Candidates must therefore balance policies that favor particular interest groups with those that align with the general interest.
The equilibrium of this game is characterized by:
Theoretical Results:
Only production sectors represented by a pressure group benefit from positive protection, while non-represented sectors face a negative import tariff on the goods they produce.
Explanation:
The influence game thus leads to a redistribution, through a system of taxes, of resources from non-organized sectors to politically organized ones.
Predictions of the model:
The level of protection in a sector is higher when:
Predictions of the model:(cont’d):
🤔 Does this sounds like a realistic depiction of US trade policy?
Tariff: the most beautiful word in the dictionary 1
But many tools are available for trade policy:
Let’s now graphically analyze the consequences of implementing an ad valorem tariff, “t”.
We assume a small country, importing a homogeneous good (rice).
In this situation, the domestic price of the good is equivalent to the international price pm.
This situation characterizes the initial equilibrium, with international trade but without protection measures.
We then assume that a tariff “t” is implemented as a percentage of the value of rice imports, for example, 20 or 30 percent.
Summary: The implementation of this tariff triggers a series of reactions from rice producers (for example), consumers (and traders), until a new equilibrium is reached in the domestic rice market.
If we add up surplus and public revenues (1 Euro gained or lost by the producer = 1 Euro gained or lost by consumers = 1 Euro of public revenue). The tariff has a negative effect: gray areas (triangle = deadweight losses).
Important point: identify the winners and losers.
Conclusion: the tariff mainly serves to protect the producer. If it is per-unit, it helps protect the consumer (from low-priced goods that may be of poor quality). It allows for the collection of tariff revenues.
The same analysis can done for all other protection measures.
To measure the distortion of a particular measure they are often converted in ad valorem equivalent.
Very complex subject (in terms of quantitative analyses).
Non-tariff measures (NTMs) are policy measures, other than tariffs, that can affect international trade in goods.
The effect of NTMs on trade can be the primary objective of the implemented policy (e.g., quotas or import bans), or it can be a consequence of another policy objective (e.g., product quality control or packaging requirements).
According to WTO agreements, the use of NTMs is allowed under certain circumstances. They include, among others, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) or the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), both negotiated during the Uruguay Round.
These agreements allow governments to implement policies with a legitimate objective even if they may increase trade costs.
However, NTMs are sometimes used as a means to circumvent free trade rules and protect domestic industries at the expense of foreign competition. In this case, NTMs are called non-tariff barriers (NTBs).
It is very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish legitimate NTMs from protectionist NTMs, especially since the same measure can be employed for different reasons.
To facilitate the collection and dissemination of information on NTMs in force in each country, a classification system for NTMs was developed in 2008 by a group of experts from 8 international organizations - FAO, IMF, ITC, OECD, UNCTAD, UNIDO, World Bank, and WTO - and revised in 2009 and 2012.
This classification has a total of 16 chapters ranging from letter A to letter P. It distinguishes between import measures (Chapters A to O) imposed by the importing country and export measures (Chapter P) applied by the exporting country itself. Import measures are then categorized into two main groups, technical measures and non-technical measures.
Technical Measures
Non-Technical Measures
Examples of measures classified in Chapter A:
Chapter B: Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
Examples:
Chapter C: Customs inspection and other border crossing formalities in C
Examples:
How much NTMs?
Results:
Because technical NTMs address market imperfections, transparency, negative externalities… and can therefore have a positive effect on demand for imported goods.
But there is always a negative correlation between the price of the good and imported quantities.
In a world of GVCs, the trade policy of an economy cannot be exclusively focused on trade barriers between that economy and its direct trading partners.
The entire value chain and bottlenecks existing upstream and downstream between third countries must be considered.
The success of an economy in international markets depends as much on its ability to import top-quality inputs as on its ability to export.
Value-added trade data show how GVCs amplify the costs of customs protection mechanisms: cumulative nature of tariffs since intermediate consumptions cross borders repeatedly.
19th century: period of relative free trade
Late 19th - early 20th century: first wave of protectionism
Between the two wars, Great Depression
The GATT (1947-1994)
The WTO (1995-2025)
Promote wealth creation through international trade liberalization, but obstacles:
Grant special concessions and assistance to developing countries
A negotiation framework…
Only governments (under influence?) participate in the game
Mercantilism vs. Ricardianism.
Non-discrimination (clarification of GATT principles)
Most-Favored-Nation Clause (“MFN clause”): any trade advantage granted by one country to another (even if it is not a WTO member) must be immediately extended to all WTO members.
In the USA:
In Europe:
Future is hard to predict, but look at the past
When taking office in January 2017, President Trump has challenged some regional free trade agreements:
Then commercial protection measures announced in March 2018, exceptional in their motivation and importance.
First Trump administration: a 58% increase in the number of (retaliatory) anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures between 2016 and 2017.
With one exception (the first self-initiated case in 25 years), their initiative comes from companies, even if they respond to signals sent by the government.
Two measures announced in March 2018:
In principle: these measures allowed under WTO rules (exception for national security reasons).
In form: contrary to commitments because purely political bases.
Measures especially exceptional by the amounts involved:
What do you think?
What is the motivation for Mr Trump?
Should other countries retaliate?
Will history repeat itself?